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NoT'rs AND Comam's
raising the level of the officer by an enforced system of education, or
by paying the officer a higher salary? Both remedies would seem de-
sirable, but whatever the solution, attention should be given to the
problem, and the situation should be re-examined from time to time.
C mm R. Hm
THE THEORIES OF JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
The purpose of this note is to discuss the various theories by which
the courts give effect to the intention with which a deposit in a joint
account is made where one person contributes the entire amount de-
posited and expressly provides for the right of survivorship. The cases
suggest three principal theories which will be examined. Some courts
sustain the account on the theory that a joint tenancy with survivor-
ship is created by a gift inter vivos, while others rely on the notion
that the deposit results in a third party beneficiary type contract with
the bank. A third group base the validity of these deposits on
statutory provisions which explicitly authorize the deposit or raise a
presumption in favor of its validity. The discussion will be confined
to the rights created between the joint depositors since the rights and
liabilities of the bank normally are prescribed by statute and present
no substantial problem.'
GIFr THEORY
Those jurisdictions which classify the joint account as a gift creating
joint ownership, require that two essential elements of a valid gift inter
vivos be present: an adequate manifestation of donative intent, and a
delivery.2 They do not require a manual delivery of possession to the
donee, however, since this is impossible in this type of transaction.
The physical act of depositing money under this theory amounts to a
delivery to the bank for the donee and is sufficient. Neither is it re-
quired that the donor relinquish complete control of the subject mat-
ter by creating exclusive control in the donee. Since a surrender of
complete control would deny the donor-depositor the right to with-
draw money from the account, the cases hold that the delivery require-
ment is met if there is an adequate manifestation of intention to re-
linquish exclusive control.3 In other words, the creation of joint con-
' For a compilation of statutes, see note, 9 CoRNEiL. L. Q. 48, 49 n. 6 (1923).
'Bachmann v. Reardon, 188 Conn. 665, 88 A. 2d 391 (1952). For additional
cases on this theory see annotation, 149 A. L. R. 879, 880 (1944).
'Wilt v. Brokaw, 196 F. 2d 69 (7th Cir. 1952).
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trol over the money is an adequate surrender of control in the joint
account type of gift and may be effected without a formal delivery
to the donee, either actual or symbolic.
It is essential under this theory that the donor manifest an intention
to create a present interest in the donee, because otherwise the transfer
of ownership would be testamentary.4 The written form of the de-
posit is evidence of this intention, but apparently it may be supple-
mented by evidence as to what was said by the donor at the time of
the deposit and also by what he does thereafter. Some courts seem to
take the position that the deposit form evidences both an intention
to create a present gift and to create a gift in the future,5 and there-
fore the form of the deposit is not conclusive as to the non-testamentary
character of the deposit.0 The fallacy in this reasoning is that the
courts view the donor's intention with the advantage of hindsight.
Because the issue in litigation arises between the donee and the donor's
estate after his death and because the donee made no withdrawals from
the account during the lifetime of the donor, the conclusion is drawn
that the donor intended for the gift to take effect at his death.7 From
the viewpoint of the parties at the time of the deposit the actual ques-
tion as to intention should be: Did the donee have the right to make
withdrawals during the lifetime of the depositor? Undoubtedly the
answer to this question must be yes, or the deposit serves no purpose
whatsoever. If he can make withdrawals, then certainly he has a
present interest. Some courts hold, nevertheless, that although the
donee can make withdrawals from the creation of the account, he has
no present interest because his withdrawals are made for the con-
venience of the depositor.8 If the donor-depositor only intended that
withdrawals by the donee be for his convenience, he certainly could
have adopted a more advantageous method for achieving this purpose
such as giving the donee a power of attorney. Conceding that the de-
positor's manifestation of intention should be the controlling factor,
it would seem that the best evidence of the intention of the parties is
what they have reduced to writing, particularly in view of the rule
against varying the terms of a written instrument by parol or extrinsic
evidence.9
'Murray v. Gadsden, 197 F. 2d 194 (D. C. Cir. 1952); see 38 C. J. S. 835(1943).
Bachmann v. Reardon, 138 Conn. 665, 88 A. 2d 391 (1952).
'Brown v. Navarre, 64 Ariz. 262, 169 P. 2d 85 (1946).
'Phoenix Title and Trust Co. v. King, 58 Ariz. 477, 121 P. 2d 429 (1942).8 Murray v. Gadsden, 197 F. 2d 194 (D. C. Cir. 1952).
' One type of agreement ordinarily used in a joint bank account:
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CoNTRicr THEoRY
Typical of the cases relying on the contract theory is Hill v.
Haven,'0 where the deceased converted his bank account into a joint
account in the name of himself and his wife, and each signed the
routine signature card. The court held that the agreement of the bank
to pay to either of them or the survivor, any part or all of the money
was conclusive. Under this theory intention is still the controlling
factor, but the rights of the parties are contractual and no rationaliza-
tion based on joint ownership is necessary. There is also no problem
as to the testamentary character of the transaction. Where the parties
have expressed their intention in the written agreement in clear and
definite terms the contract cannot be varied or altered by parol evi-
dence." The agreement must be signed by both parties in order to
create the joint bank account. Fraud, undue influence, or alterations
may be shown by oral testimony as in any other writing. Absence of
consideration may create some reluctance to follow this theory, but
this objection can be overcome easily by conceiving of the contract
as a third party beneficiary type. Thus, in consideration of the de-
posit the bank agrees with the contracting depositor that it will pay
Joint Account-Payable to either or survivor
We agree and declare that all funds now, or hereafter deposited to this ac-
count are, and shall be, our joint property and owned by us as joint tenants with
right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common, and upon the death of either
of us any balance in said account shall become the absolute property of the sur-
vivor. The entire account or any part thereof may be withdrawn by, or upon the
order of, either of us or the survivor. It is especially agreed that withdrawals of
funds of the survivor shall be binding upon us and our heirs, legatees, assigns and
personal representatives.
SIGNED John Doe
SIGNED Richard Roe
If this is not a clear manifestation of intention it would be hard to visualize
what would be.
" 242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W. 2d 870 (1952). In the case of Bishop v. Bishop,
293 Ky. 652, 170 S.W. 2d 1 (1942) the Court of Appeals decided the joint de-
posit created a contract by saying, "Since the question is one of first impression,
we have decided to uphold the right of Mrs. Bishop to the remainder of the joint
account upon the contract theory. Especially do we believe this to be proper
when we consider the facts that Mr. and Mrs. Bishop went to the bank and dis-
cussed with the cashier what they desired to do; that both of them placed all the
money they then had in the bank in the joint account; and the arrangement was
agreed to by and between the Bishops and the bank cashier. Clearly, rights were
established which could not have been brushed aside by the acts of one of the
parties even though the agreement would have permitted either of the Bishops to
withdraw all of the money from the account."
'Hill v. Haven, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W. 2d 870 (1952); First Security Bank
of Utah v. Burgi, 251 P. 2d 297 (Utah, 1952). See notes 103 A. L. R. 1123, 1140(1936), 149 A. L. R. 879, 897 (1944).
KENTuCKY LAw JouRNAL
the money to the depositor, the co-depositor (donee beneficiary), or
to the survivor of them. The legal relationship arising is purely that
of creditor-debtor, and no problem of revocability is raised since any
withdrawal is merely a compliance with the terms of the agreement.
STATUTORY THEORY
The New York statute illustrates how the joint bank account may
be sustained without direct resort to common law principals of gift
theory or the contract theory. It provides:
When a deposit shall be made by any person in the
names of such depositor and another person and in form to be paid to
either or the survivor of them, such deposit and any additions thereto
made by either of such persons after the making thereof shall become
the property of such persons as joint tenants, and, together with all
dividends created thereon, shall be held for the exclusive use of such
persons and may be paid to either during the lifetime of both or to
the survivor after the death of one of them, and such payment and
the receipt or acquittance of the one to whom such payment is
made shall be a valid and sufficient release and discharge to the sav-
ings bank for all payments made on account of such deposit prior to
the receipt by the savings bank of notice in writing not to pay such
deposit in accordance with the terms thereof. The making of the
deposit in such a form shall, in the absence of fraud or undue in-
fluence, be conclusive evidence, in any action or proceeding to which
either the savings bank or the surviving depositor is a party, of the
intention of both depositors to vest title to such deposit and the
addition thereto in such survivor.=
In the case of Moskowitz v. Marrow,13 it was held that this statute
raises a rebuttable presumption that a joint tenancy with survivorship
is created by the deposit, and after the death of one depositor the
presumption is conclusive. However, as to withdrawals totaling more
than half of the original deposit during the lifetime of both depositors,
the presumption of joint tenancy may be overcome by competent evi-
dence.14 A similar approach has been used in California under an
identical statute. 15 In the recent Michigan case of Betker v. Ide 6 a
similar statute17 was held to be for the benefit and protection of both
the bank and its depositors, and creates a presumption in favor of
survivorship when the joint deposit in form is payable to the survivor.
Although the particular deposit in litigation did not meet the statutory
I2N. Y. BANmKNG LAw, sec. 239(4) (Thompson, 1939).
'2251 N. Y. 380, 167 N.E. 506 (1929).
"In Re Casseen, 66 N. Y. S. 799 (1946).
'Paterson v. Comastri, 244 P. 2d 902 (Cal. 1951) interpreting CAL. GE.
LAws act 652 sec. 15a (Deering, 1944).
10335 Mich. 291, 55 N.W. 2d 835 (1952).
13 MIcH. Comp. LAws sec. 487.703 (1948).
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requirement, if it had, the court indicated, it could be rebutted by
competent evidence. Under both the Michigan and New York statutes,
the deposit during the lifetime of the depositors raises a presumption
that a joint tenancy was created, but, this can be rebutted by com-
petent evidence. It would seem that the only way to rebut this
statutory presumption is by the introduction of oral or extrinsic evi-
dence, and this conflict with the parol evidence rule creates confusion
rather than eliminates it.
In the 1951 Minnesota case of Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach,18
where the account was held subject to garnishment for the individual
debt of one of the depositors, the court, holding that the depositors
were bound by the written agreement, said:
Since the type of ownership which the bank and its depositors have
created by their contract defies classification under the traditional
concepts of property ownership, we are forced to treat this case as
presenting a contract question and must decide what the incidents
of this type of ownership are primarily by reference to the terms of
the contract creating it. 9
And the court went on to say:
A joint bank account of this kind is a creature of contract between
parties avowedly indifferent to the exact percentage of ownership be-
tween themselves. The law should take them at their word and give
effect to their contract without making detailed and belated evi-
dentiary inquiries to establish factual ownership. Any presumption,
whether conclusive or rebuttable, that part or all of these joint ac-
counts are immune from garnishment has the effect of either creating
or tending to create a nonstatutory exemption for the parties using
them, and any attempt to base the extent of garnishment upon the
respective amounts of the account owned by each depositor will
compel courts and juries to grope with problems which the de-
positors themselves have declared to be of no consequence. Let
them abide the results which flow from their own declared purposes.
The court recognized that a contract was created which could not be
varied by oral testimony, nor should it be since the parties have clearly
expressed their intention. The statutes and the cases interpreting them
in the different jurisdictions are in conflict on this point, and the result
reached often is no more satisfactory than that reached under the gift
IB 223 Minn. 467, 47 N.W. 2d 194 (1951). Here both depositors contributed
to the account; but for the position that it would have made no difference had
only one contributed, see Vesey v. Vesey, 54 N.W. 2d 385 (Minn. 1952). In this
case the surviving depositor killed the other depositor, the court would not allow
the survivor to take the balance, not because she took from the estate of the
deceased but because both depositors had a right to withdraw all of the account,
and the survivor had prevented the deceased from exercising his right, so they
would not let her profit from her wrong.
'Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, 223 Minn. 467 at -, 47 N.W. 2d 194 at
196 (1951).
0 Id. at -, 47 N.W. 2d at 197.
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theory. Surely the legislatures intend by their enactments to simplify
rather than complicate the problem.
Conclusion
Under all three theories intention is a controlling factor and it
would seem that the best theory is the one which affords the best
opportunity to determine this intention accurately. Intention is pri-
marily a question of fact, and the average person using the joint bank
account probably intends to give his co-depositor a legal power to
draw upon the account, and the legal right of survivorship. Since it
is intended that the co-depositor should be able to demand payment
from the bank, it is inconsistent with this intention to say that the
depositor merely intended a testamentary disposition. It is also incon-
sistent with this intention to say that the depositor made the account
for his own convenience, or to say that survivorship was intended but
no right to make withdrawals during the life of the depositor was in-
tended. It is not inconsistent with this intention to say that the bene-
ficiary of the contract, or the donee of the gift, has the rights and
interests provided for in the agreement.
It is submitted that the contract theory will lead to the proper re-
sult in the majority of cases, and should be followed, because in apply-
ing it the courts do not need to use the historical and sometimes con-
fusing principles of gift intention. Nor are they confined to any pre-
scribed statutory provision. They can look at the agreement, and base
their decision on general contract principles. Under any of the theories,
however, the desired result of giving effect to the true intentions of the
parties will be reached if the written agreement or signature card is
held to be conclusive. Holding the parties to the written manifesta-
tion of intention works no hardship on either of them, because if they
intend otherwise, they can so express themselves to the bank in
writing. Under any other rule there is great risk that virtually every
joint deposit will result in litigation.
JAmms T. YOtNGBLOOD
MASTER AND SERVANT-THE SIMPLE TOOL DOCTRINE
In a recent North Dakota case, Olson v. Kern Temple, Ancient
Arabic Order of the Mystic Shrine,1 the plaintiff, a member of a fra-
ternal organization, volunteered to assist in decorating a pavilion for
the use of the organization and was injured when he fell from a loose
' 77 N. D. 365, 43 N.W. 2d 385 (1950).
